The
Hindu Concept of Vegetarianism:
A
Philosophical Defense
By
Frank
Morales
- University of Wisconsin-Madison
The ancient
Hindu diet of vegetarianism has recently been gaining a great deal of
popularity, both as a diet and as a way of life. Influenced by a number of
different factors, millions of
people worldwide have been increasingly turning to this ancient vegetarian
lifestyle. In the United States alone, there are an estimated
twenty-million people who consider themselves vegetarians. Their reasons for
turning to the vegetarian diet are almost as diverse as are the individuals
themselves. As medical data continually streams
in linking meat-eating with a number of illnesses, such as cancer and heart
disease, many have chosen to renounce meat for health reasons while others have
decided to become vegetarians for primarily ethical and
moral concerns. As the animal rights movement continues to gain
momentum, many are beginning to recognize the natural link between fighting to
alleviate the suffering of animals in laboratories and hunting ranges and our
refusal to consume their tortured bodies in our kitchens.
Another concern
of vegetarians is the adverse impact upon our
environment due to the wasteful policies of the meat industry.
Consequently, a large number of environmental organizations have adopted
vegetarianism into their agendas. Despite the fact that vegetarianism has
gained a great deal of recent popularity, however, it still remains a little
understood phenomenon to some. What is even less known is the truly ancient and
spiritual roots of the vegetarian philosophy. In the following, we will explore
the philosophy of vegetarianism from the ancient Hindu perspective.
One of the central tenets of Hindu philosophy is the
concept of ahimsa, or non-violence. While many ethical systems espouse some
form of non-violent ethic or another, what makes the Hindu practice of ahimsa
radically unique from other systems is the universal scope of its concern. For
most ethical schools of thought, the concept of ethical concern extends no
further than the human race. The criteria for whether or not a being is worthy
of being the object of compassion is determined by the species of the being
involved. For Hindus, on the other hand, all living creatures are worthy of
respect, compassion and ethical concern, irregardless of whether they are human
or non-human.
The general Western consensus is that humans are completely justified in
their treatment of animals, both theologically and philosophically. From
the Christian philosophical perspective, it has been claimed that animals are
of an inferior order of being in comparison to humans. This being the apparent
case, it is perfectly permissible for humans to kill animals for consumption,
or for any other purpose they deem appropriate. Animals were, after all,
created by a loving and compassionate God - so the Biblical argument goes - for
our own needs. Animals are seen as being mere means to an end. That end is the
gratification and satisfaction of human needs. Thus, all non-human living
beings have no inherent value as ends in themselves, but only acquire a minimum
sense of value as objects for our use. Indeed, God Himself seems to have
confirmed this functionalist relationship between human and non-human animal in
the Bible:
“God blessed
them saying: ‘be fertile and multiply; fill the earth and subdue it. Have
dominion over the fish of the sea, the birds in the air, and all the living
creatures that move on the earth.’” (Genesis 1:28)
One
representative of this distinctly anthropocentric outlook was Thomas Aquinas, the great synthesizer of Aristotelian
philosophy and Christian dogma. He has written that,
“...irrational
creatures have no fellowship with human life, which is regulated by reason.
Hence friendship with irrational creatures is impossible...”.
(Summa
Theologica)
Thus stands the traditional Christian argument in favor
of man’s continued exploitation and killing of animals.
If one examines
these opinions with a deeper philosophical scrutiny and from the perspective of
the Hindu concept of ahimsa, however, their many flaws are quickly revealed.
First of all, while it is apparent that God gave us a superior position over
animals in the hierarchy of being, this higher status does not automatically
give us the right to kill other life-forms simply for our selfish ends. Mere
superiority over another sentient being can never be interpreted as a license
for abusing a less capable being, or a class of such beings.
The contemporary
philosopher Bernard Rollin confirms this in his
Animal Rights and Human Morality,
“Even if man has been placed by God at the peak of the Great
Chain of Being, or even in command of it, it does not follow that the creatures
beneath him many be treated in any way he sees fit.”
If it were the case that superior beings have the right
to exploit supposedly inferior ones, then it would be morally permissible for
one human to enslave and victimize another.
An intellectually or physically more powerful man could
justifiably kill another, weaker man. Physically weaker women and children
would be at the mercy of stronger, abusive men.
Indeed, the
entire moral order - which is based on the premise that ethical means, and not
merely brute force, should be used to achieve ends - would collapse.
Moreover, the Hindu position is that if we
are, indeed, superior to other life-forms, we should clearly exhibit that
superior nature precisely in our actions towards them. It is the very
height of irrationality, says Hinduism, to claim that our inherent intellectual
and ethical superiority over other beings gives us license to then act in
unthinking and immoral ways towards these less capable beings. Overall, then,
the traditional Christian philosophical arguments against compassion towards
animals simply does not stand up to close scrutiny.
Two other,
somewhat more sophisticated, arguments used to justify
the unwarranted killing of animals are as follows. First, animals are incapable of thinking rationally. Therefore,
they are not worthy of the same ethical consideration that humans are. Only a
being who is able to formulate (or at least understand) ethical principles via
the process of discursive reasoning is eligible to be considered a moral agent,
and therefore a moral object. The second argument
is that only beings that are capable of communicating through language are to
be deemed worthy of moral consideration. Let us now explore these anti-ahimsa arguments in more depth.
While seemingly
valid arguments, from the Hindu perspective these two opinions are revealed to
be somewhat flawed. If we were to hypothetically accept these two criteria as
being valid, namely that only beings who exhibit the abilities to think
rationally and to communicate verbally were worthy of being treated morally, it
would then follow that several categories of human beings would also
consequently lie outside the bounds of moral consideration. Human infants, for example,
would not pass this criteria for ethical inclusion. Infants are incapable of
either thinking rationally or of speaking. Does this fact, then, give us the
right to kill human infants at will? According to the standard of judging who
is worthy of moral treatment outlined above, the answer would have to be yes.
The argument for ahimsa can be further developed.
For the defender
of Western anthropocentric ethics may then attempt to rebut that while a human infant may be presently incapable of rational thought
and speech, he/she is still categorically - and solely - worthy of our ethical
treatment because there lies within this human infant at least the potential
for these two faculties. Given time, the infant will eventually (and hopefully)
think rationally and be capable of human speech. The new, broadened, standard
for a being having inclusion within the scope of ethical concern would then be
the possession of at least the potential for rational thought and language.
This anti-ahimsa
argument, however, presents yet another problem. For there are several
categories of human beings who do not possess even this minimalist potential.
For example, what of a mute person who is
simultaneously suffering from severe mental retardation and who will,
consequently, never truly have even this potential? What of someone’s mute mom
or dad who may be suffering from irreversible Alzheimer’s disease, and who has
thus lost this potential? Again, following the logical chain of thought
contained in the anti-ahimsa argument, these individuals would fall completely
outside the scope of moral concern. The contemporary philosopher and
bioethicist Peter Singer goes so far as to say that, “Whatever the test we
propose as a means of separating human from non-human animals, it is plain that
if all non-human animals are going to fail it, some humans will fail as well.”
(In Defense of Animals) In order to be consistent with his arguments, someone
who opposes the concept of ahimsa would be forced to treat these people in the
same terrible manner in which he treats animals: he would have a right to kill
them at will.
The problem with
these anti-ahimsa arguments is that they are using the right criteria for the
wrong argument. The abilities to think rationally and speak are, indeed, correct
standards for judging whether or not a being can be a moral agent, that is,
whether or not a being is capable of comprehending and being accountable for
its actions. Most human beings fall under this category. However, being a) a
moral agent and being b) an object of moral concern are two completely
different things. Agreeing with this criteria, Bernard
Rollin writes,
“It is easy to see, of course, why
rationality would be important for a being to be considered a moral agent, that
is, a being whose actions and intentions can be assessed as right and wrong,
good or bad...but it is, of course, not obvious that one must be capable of
being a moral agent before one can be considered an object of moral concern.”
This point
having been firmly established, then, exactly what would be the proper
criterion for deciding which living beings will or will not be included within
the range of moral concern?
For Sanatana Dharma (Hinduism), to be a proper object of
moral concern, all that is required is that a being is
sentient, that is, that it be a living being capable of experiencing feeling,
and thus pain. All living beings, irregardless of their physical form,
are atman, or individual units of consciousness, in their innermost essence.
The attributes of atman are sat, chit and ananda, or being, knowledge and
bliss. The atman is the ultimate experiencer of all that occurs to the body,
either good or bad. That being the case, causing any suffering to any living
being is considered to be the greatest offense. If any
being is capable of experiencing pain, regardless of what species that being is
a member of, it is immoral to needlessly inflict pain on that being.
That a being is
unable to express itself rationally only tells us that we will not be able to
engage in a philosophical dialectic with it or have a conversation with it
about the latest fashion trends. But, by registering
such a clearly and universally
recognizable verbal sign of suffering as a scream when we abuse it, torture it or try to
kill it, a conscious being
is pleading with us to cease its suffering. The entire realm of
living beings thus falls within the scope of moral concern. It is in keeping with this ethic of
valuing all life that thoughtful Hindus follow a strict
vegetarian diet, a diet which seeks to reduce suffering to its minimal
level.
